“We really don’t have enough migrants to implement ambitious plans”

Migration for Russia is a natural process. You will no longer surprise anyone with citizens of a different nationality who perform repair work, work in the service sector, or simply trade in the market. It’s easy to explain: even despite the crisis throughout the world, our country is one of the five countries that most attract migrants.

The USA and Canada also appear in leading positions on the list. The mechanism for receiving such citizens is different in each territory. If in the United States you need to pass many commissions and prove your qualifications, then you can simply come to Russia without education or even basic knowledge of the Russian language.

This situation is quite complicated, because there is a benefit for both parties. Our country receives a labor force that is profitable from an economic point of view, and migrants have the opportunity to gain ways for development and improve living conditions. But today, in 2021, the number of foreign citizens who entered Russia to obtain permanent residence is 6 million people.

Statistics show that about 60% of them entered the country illegally or their permits have already expired. Therefore, the latest news from the FSGS speaks of a number of changes in migration legislation. Many amendments began to take effect in 2021, some have been postponed until 2021. Only one thing is clear: in terms of “work front”, these changes are the most global in Russia.

Migration Challenges: The Root Cause of Change

In 2021, the situation has developed that illegally arrived citizens, due to ignorance of the language and the rules of law in Russia, interact with society and become the cause of a lot of problems. According to statistics, over the past few years the number of crimes committed by immigrants from other states on our territory has increased. This includes fraud, inconsistency of migration documents, theft, and vandalism.

It became clear that the problematic issue, or more precisely how migration affects the internal life of Russia, represents a very serious conflict of interests. Moreover, many experts predict that the flow of migrating citizens will only increase in the coming year. This is due to the difficult economic and political situation in the world. Conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, a widespread deterioration in the standard of living in countries less developed compared to the Russian Federation - these are all the reasons why people so want to get to Russian territory, and 2021 has become confirmation of this. That is why there was a need for stricter control of citizens and changes in the legislative framework.

For the first time since 2013, Russia has seen an increase in migration

Analyzing absolute indicators, the authors of the report note that over the past three years, starting with the maximum migration volume in 2014, the number of citizens from the main countries that are donors of labor migration has decreased. From Uzbekistan - by more than 30% compared to 2014, Tajikistan - by 13%. Over the past three years, the number of migrants from Azerbaijan and Moldova has decreased.​

According to Sergei Boldyrev, program director of the international Labor Migration Alliance, the number of migrants from the CIS in Russia decreased by 5% in January 2021 compared to the same period in 2016 (from 8.2 million people to 8.1 million).

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Nevertheless, the share of CIS citizens among all visiting foreigners remains at 85%, the report notes. There is still no restoration of the pre-crisis level of the number of foreigners from developed Western countries, experts note. The decrease in net migration with non-CIS countries is especially noticeable after the surge in 2011–2013. If in 2012 and 2013 net migration with these countries exceeded 20 thousand people, then since 2014 it has been 10 thousand or less.

Reasons for decline and growth

The report links the dynamics of migration indicators to changes in the situation in migration partner countries, as well as changes in Russia itself. The migration process depends on the liberalization or tightening of policies in the field of migration and citizenship, as well as socio-economic indicators, according to the authors of the report.

Boldyrev calls the decrease in the total number of migrants since 2014 smooth and attributes it to the introduction of sanctions against Russia. “[After the introduction of sanctions against Russia], accordingly, the [Russian] economic situation worsened, and the deterioration led to a decrease in demand for labor resources,” the RBC expert said.

The positive dynamics of net migration from neighboring countries in the last year is associated with “hope for economic recovery,” says Vladimir Mukomel, director of the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies. “Migrants from neighboring countries mainly come to work, and now the situation [in Russia] is relatively stable,” he explained.

Going for a patent: how migrants win the right to work in Russia Photo gallery

Centers of attraction

The main centers of attraction for migrants, the report notes, have remained virtually unchanged. Moscow and the Moscow region are in the lead (the total migration increase in 2021 was 132.8 thousand people), St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region - 66.4 thousand, Krasnodar Territory - 55.7 thousand, Sevastopol and the Republic of Crimea - 24, 1 thousand people.

At the same time, many regions of the Volga Federal District continue to lose population, as do the regions of the European North, North Caucasus, Siberia and the Far East. An average of 20 thousand people left the latter in the previous three years, the report notes. It is possible that in the future the migration decline in the population of the Far East will stop, researchers note, but for now, on a national scale, they continue to remain a periphery.

The report notes: the scale of emigration from the country recorded by Rosstat (its consistent decline since the 2000s) is not confirmed by foreign statistics. For most countries, the number of emigrants from Russia differs several times from Rosstat data, the monitoring says. The report deals specifically with migration to non-CIS countries, and not to the CIS, explained one of the authors, leading researcher at the Institute of Social Analysis and Forecasting of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Nikita Mkrtchyan.

“Statistics are better collected in the countries and regions of arrival: when leaving Russia, we are not required to register anywhere, and in the countries where our people are leaving, they are taken into account,” he said. According to Mkrtchyan, in countries of destination the statistics on emigrants from Russia are many times higher, and this is due to the fact that after moving, former compatriots “most likely begin to register somewhere and receive residence permits.” The statistics may differ “three or ten times,” but in the countries of destination they are much higher, the expert explained.

Labor migration: changes and latest news

Most often, labor migration is typical for Russia. In simple terms, people come to the country to find a new job. According to statistics in 2021, the countries for whose residents migration to Russia is the most typical include:

1. Uzbekistan (more than 2 million people).
2. Ukraine (more than 2 million).
3. Tajikistan (about a million).
4. Kazakhstan (45 thousand).
5. Armenia (30-35 thousand).

In 2021, the number of citizens from Ukraine is expected to only grow. Therefore, it is important to know the changes that were made to the legislation in 2015. Punishments for violating the rules of stay in the country have also become tougher. For example, the amount of fines has increased. In some cases, people are deported home for up to 10 years without the right to review.

How many Russians are leaving the country?

Over the past seven years, the number of those leaving Russia has been growing every year.
In 2021 alone, more than 377 thousand people left the country, Rosstat calculated, and this is a record figure. In fact, there may be more emigrants. For example, the media resource “Project” claims that official figures are underestimated by six times and that the Russian Federation ranks third in the world in terms of the number of emigrants, right after India and Mexico. Despite doubts about its accuracy, Rosstat's information reflects the dynamics of emigration from Russia. The number of emigration reached its peak in the late 90s, but there was a sharp decline in the mid-2000s. The fewest citizens left the country in 2009 - only 32 thousand people. Since 2013, the numbers have been growing. In 2021, the number of emigrants, compared to zero, has increased 10 times.

List of new amendments for migrants from 2021

It is worth noting that migration is a serious problem not only in Russia. Today, many European countries are suffering from an influx of migrants. This is due to the turbulent situation in the East, including Syria. People are trying with all their might to leave the areas captured by terrorists.

Due to this, illegal border crossings flourish. Because of this, crime surges begin, including human trafficking and drug importation. Therefore, it is not only Russia that has tightened its legislative framework. Thus, in Ireland, up to 10 years in prison are provided for violating the migration regime. You can be deported to the United States without the right to re-cross the border.

New amendments in 2021 include the following:

• presence of a foreign passport;
• indication of the reason for arrival with the place of future work;
• a certain period for registration;
• obtaining a general patent;
• mandatory exams;
• registration of medical and social insurance;
• simplified submission of documents for students.

Let's consider all these points in more detail. For example, since January 2016, citizens of other countries can no longer use a regular passport in Russia. An exception is now made neither for residents of Tajikistan, nor for Ukraine, nor for any other states. Only a foreign passport is quoted in the Russian Federation for foreign citizens. Such amendments will not affect only immigrants from the Eurasian Union, which includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan. What’s noteworthy is that the government clarified that those workers who are already in Russia can apply for such a passport during 2021.

Who is now going to work in Russia?

There are fewer migrants, but they are more likely to work legally and less likely to complain about the hostility of local residents. However, this does not mean that relations between Russian citizens and migrants have become better: perhaps these relations simply cease to exist - everyone lives in their own universe.

NADEZHDA PETROVA

Law and order

If you want people to follow the laws, make them easy to follow. To residents of the Russian Federation, however, this principle may seem like an attribute of some kind of fantasy world - the one where little princes live, or the one where the gods forbid believers to eat broccoli - but, judging by survey data from migrants, this principle is sometimes implemented even in Russian practice .

Sociological survey of migrants from the CIS countries and Georgia, conducted in February-March 2021 by the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies for the National Research University Higher School of Economics (sample of 8.7 thousand people, including both temporary labor migrants and foreigners with a temporary residence permit or visa residence), showed that

more than 70% of migrants working in the Russian Federation do so legally.

It is not recommended to directly compare these data with the data of the previous survey conducted in 2011 - Deputy Director of the HSE Institute of Demography Mikhail Denisenko notes that in these two surveys the wording of questions about legality differed and this could affect the result. But the difference is still significant: previously, about 60% of respondents declared their legality. And, in addition, the positive trend is confirmed by official data.

“As of June 1, 2021, labor migrants had 1.7 million valid work permits (work permits or patents) in their hands, almost 1 million more had the right to work without such documents (citizens of the EAEU countries),” thus, the opportunity 64% of migrants who entered the Russian Federation for this purpose had a legal job, stated Nikita Mkrtchyan and Yulia Florinskaya, employees of the Institute of Demography at the Higher School of Economics, in a joint article (see “Monitoring the economic situation in Russia” No. 12, 2017, Gaidar Institute of Economics, RANEPA, VAVT ). Whereas six years ago, according to Denisenko, the FMS estimated the share of legal employment at approximately half. And even a year ago the situation was a little worse - by 3 percentage points.

Migrant has a day off

“In general, the desire of labor migrants to become legalized in the Russian labor market in 2021 has clearly manifested itself,” Mkrtchyan and Florinskaya believe. “Apparently, migrants are gradually adapting to the new migration rules introduced in 2015 (in particular, we are talking about replacing permits to work with patents for migrants from visa-free countries), and to a new economic reality. The same cannot be said about Russian employers, who, on the contrary, are in no hurry to register migrants: the number of notifications they sent about concluding contracts with foreign workers has decreased compared to the same period last year.”

But most often, completely ordinary citizens of the Russian Federation ignore the law: the survey showed that the largest share of illegal employment is observed among labor migrants working in households: 50% - this is significantly more than in trade or construction (about 30% each).

Labor income

Having a legal status is, in principle, associated with higher incomes, but, as Mikhail Denisenko notes, “the difference between the earnings of legal and illegal migrants in general turned out to be small.” The existing differences are associated, in his opinion, “mainly with the areas of activity in which migrants are employed and the periods during which they carry out this activity.” Based on the data, it can be assumed, for example, that “Ukrainians, from this point of view, are probably in a more advantageous position than Azerbaijanis, who come for short periods and many of whom are employed primarily in the trade sector, probably in the enterprises of their fellow countrymen. An entrepreneur does not see much difference when hiring Ukrainians with different migration statuses (legal and illegal).”

Average salary of labor migrants in Russia in 2017 (thousand rubles)

Source: National Research University Higher School of Economics.

The habit of entrepreneurs towards super-exploitation of foreign workers has not gone away either. The ratio of their average salary to the average salary of Russian citizens since 2011, however, has grown quite noticeably - from 72.8% to 84% (in 2011, migrants received an average of 17.7 thousand rubles, Russians - 24.3 thousand. , in 2017 - 30.1 thousand and 35.8 thousand rubles, respectively) - but the load remained disproportionately higher. According to surveys,

The average working week for foreign workers is now 59 hours (in 2011 - 59.6) versus 39.6 for Russian citizens (in 2011 - 39.9).

Employers of foreigners are most often small and medium-sized enterprises (in 2021, 40.3% of respondents were employed in enterprises with up to 10 employees, another 35.7% in enterprises with 10 to 49 employees). The jobs that migrants are entrusted with remain unskilled, regardless of their actual skills: 60% indicate that they worked in higher qualifications in their home countries, and almost two thirds of all migrants work here as unskilled workers or in trade.

The economic crisis of recent years has not had a very noticeable effect on sectoral distribution. The share of those employed in wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and household products - the main sphere of activity of migrants - decreased symbolically (from 35% in the 2011 sample to 33.6% in 2017), in utilities, social and personal services - even more symbolically increased (from 13.1% in 2011 to 13.9% in 2017).

Changes in only two sectors can perhaps be considered significant. In construction, which generally feels unimportant (a drop in the share from 23.1% in 2011 to 16.4% in 2017). And in the household sector, which in terms of attracting migrants (growth from 4.4% in 2011 to 8% in 2021) suddenly overtook hotels and restaurants (growth from 6.2% to 7.1%), as well as transport and communications (fall from 8.4% to 7%). The latter fact, however, is unlikely to be associated with any special prosperity of households - rather, it can be assumed that among the migrants there are slightly more women and more older people (including over 50 years old), who can look for jobs as nannies, caregivers and etc. And for the employer in such cases, usually recommendations (and, perhaps, “Slavic appearance”) are more important than citizenship.

You cannot give an exact answer about the change in the demographic characteristics of labor migration based on survey data, but Denisenko admits that “a shift in favor of older ages probably occurred in reality: this was facilitated by a reduction in demand for migrant labor and a large influx of migrants of different ages, including older , from Ukraine". In addition, according to him, “survey data, as well as other sources of information, show a steady increase in the share of women among labor migrants. The gender structure of the flow is changing, primarily from Central Asia, as well as from Transcaucasia (from other CIS countries the gender structure of flows was balanced).”

Sometimes they come back

These changes may be temporary. Mkrtchyan and Florinskaya note the decreasing role of Ukraine in migration to Russia. Immigrants from Ukraine still make up a significant part of the “foreign contingent” in the Russian Federation, however

in the last two years, their number, which increased sharply after the outbreak of the military conflict, has been gradually decreasing (as of June 2, 2014 - 1.6 million people, as of June 1, 2015 - 2.6 million, as of June 1, 2017 - 2, 2 million).

“Some receive Russian citizenship, some return home or reorient themselves to other areas of labor migration.”

There were also fewer foreigners from Moldova (430 thousand versus 497 thousand), Belarus (676 thousand versus 711 thousand), Kazakhstan (552 thousand versus 555 thousand) and Armenia (507 thousand versus 508) compared to 2021 thousand). And at the same time, data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs demonstrate an “earlier and statistically pronounced, compared to previous years,” seasonal increase in the number of foreigners in Russia, ensured mainly by labor migration: by the beginning of summer there were 4.2 million migrants in the country, who indicated upon entry the goal is “employment”, “which is 300 thousand more than a year earlier (3.9 million as of June 1, 2021).” And this, demographers suggest, may indicate “the preservation, even, perhaps, partial restoration of the attractiveness of Russia as a receiving country for migrants.”

At least as a country receiving immigrants from Central Asia and Azerbaijan, although the volume of migration from most of these countries has not yet reached the level of 2014. The exception is Kyrgyzstan: the number of its citizens in the Russian Federation increased from 545 thousand to 622 thousand.

The share of people from Central Asian countries among migrants will most likely continue to grow. “Migration is seen as a kind of alternative that can mitigate the problem of a strong reduction in the working-age population in Russia. But migration flows themselves have weakened and may weaken in the future, and if they do not weaken, their structure will change,” argues Denisenko. “Flows from Ukraine, from Belarus, if there are no wars and crises in these countries, will decrease because

The same processes are taking place there as in Russia - the population of working age is declining, and in Ukraine it is also leaving for foreign countries. From there, there is simply no one to come to Russia to work and live.

The situation is similar in the Caucasus. That leaves Central Asia. Central Asian migration is already predominant, but in the future its share may increase even more.”

However, there is a problem: in Central Asia, the Russian language is poorly understood, which reduces to almost zero the chances of migrants to integrate into Russian society, even if they have such a desire. In addition, a comparison of survey data for 2011 and 2021 suggests that such a desire is unlikely to arise: the use of the Russian language at work and among friends has decreased in almost all groups of migrants, except perhaps those from Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan use Russian to the least extent: even at work, it is the main language for only 53% of them.

Use of Russian as the main language of communication by migrants (%)

Source: National Research University Higher School of Economics.

Parallel universes

The declining role of the Russian language is partly explained by structural changes in migration from Central Asian countries, says Dmitry Poletaev, director of the Center for Migration Research: “In the last 10–15 years, urban migration has been replaced by rural migration, where, in principle, the population is less educated and has a poorer knowledge of some language, except for the native one. Time will pass, the picture will become even brighter if we do nothing - we don’t have special programs for teaching the Russian language or promoting the Russian language. The Russian language is leaving the republics.”

But the decline in the role of the Russian language, Poletaev continues, is a “litmus test” for other ongoing processes—the formation of “parallel communities.” “This is a two-way process. On the one hand, our society does not really accept migrants, and we are building a wall because they are somehow “different.” On the other hand, the diaspora, which is ready to take care of them, preserves them, does not allow them to interact with the population anymore: they need to rent an apartment through their own people, find a job through their own people.

We asked migrants who helps them, who they turn to if there is a need for urgent help, and we see that this “confinement to one’s own” does not disappear. They form a parallel world in society,” says Poletaev, suggesting

that things could lead to the formation of entire neighborhoods that will live according to their own laws, and to a new wave of xenophobia.

“Migration brings both positive and negative things. But we do not have integration programs that would smooth out the acute negative aspects. Children of migrants go to the same school with Russian children,” the expert gives an example. “They don’t know Russian well, which means teachers should work with them more.” They have their own traditional attitudes, which means they need to explain that in our country both boys and girls are all equal. And teachers should receive a bonus for extra work with these children. This is an integration program. I often praise the Moscow government for the migration center in Sakharovo, but when I tell them: what about integration programs? - They answer me: Muscovites will not understand us if we do this. But in my opinion, Muscovites will not understand if this is not done.”

Foreign resource

HSE research, however, shows that migrants have become significantly less likely to encounter negative attitudes towards themselves. More than half of them (54% in 2021, 53.4% ​​in 2011) are sure that “local residents will never consider newcomers as their own,” however, migrants have become more likely to characterize relations with locals as “good” (81.8 % in 2021 versus 72.1% in 2001) and are significantly less likely to complain about hostility during employment (8.9% versus 23.5%) or in everyday communication (5.9% versus 15.3%).

On the other hand, as Mikhail Denisenko notes, “although migrants say that relations with the local population are good,” perhaps it is simply the absence of bad relations: “A stratum is being formed in society that lives its own life, unlike ours. And some representatives of this stratum find it difficult to enter our lives for objective reasons: a lack of knowledge of the language and an understanding of a culture unfamiliar to them. And perhaps the following principle applies: there are migrants, there are non-migrants, they are tolerant of each other, but if possible they try not to communicate. We will probably have such a model. Not the most correct model."

This layer, however, promises to be quite mobile: among immigrants from Central Asia, a minority dreams of staying in Russia forever. And, as Denisenko says, even among respondents who want to become citizens of the Russian Federation (about a third of the sample as a whole), more than 20% would like to live with this citizenship not in Russia, but in their homeland. It’s just that “the Russian pension, maternity benefits, maternity capital - all these bonuses, which seem insignificant or small to us, are significant for the former republics of the USSR.”

Migrants' plans for living in Russia (%)

Source: National Research University Higher School of Economics.